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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AS TO DEFENDANT LARSON 
1. Whether the Defendant Larson was a member of the Moab 
Land Development Joint Venture, as alleged in the First Amended 
Complaint, and, if so, whether Defendant Larson breached any of 
the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement. 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E & 
C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000). 
2. Whether the Defendant Larson is liable to the 
Plaintiffs in any amount as the result of his execution of a 
promissory note in favor of third parties. 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E & 
C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000). 
3. Whether the Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages 
relates solely to a claim for alleged breach of contract and is 
thus not allowable as a matter of law. 
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Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E & 
C Trucking, Inc. , 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 2000). 
4. Whether the Defendant Larson is equitably estopped from 
denying his membership in the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture, and equitably estopped from denying any liability under 
a trust deed note he executed in favor of third parties. 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewable for an abuse of 
the District Court's broad discretion. See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997); Trolley Square 
Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . 
5. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to allow 
the Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the District Court's 
refusal to allow an amended pleading for an abuse of discretion. 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) . 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
The following statutes may be of significant importance in 
assisting the Court in deciding this appeal: 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — 
Application of chapter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business 
enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and 
transfer rights of joint venturers. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-13. Partner by estoppel. 
(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by 
conduct represents himself, or consents to another's 
representing him, to any one as a partner, in an existing 
partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, 
he is liable to any such person to whom such representation 
has been made who has on the faith of such representation 
given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and, if 
he has made such representation or consented to its being 
made in a public manner, he is liable to such person, 
whether the representation has or has not been made or 
communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with the 
knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation 
or consenting to its being made. 
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is 
liable as if he were an actual member of the 
partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is 
liable jointly with the other persons, if any, so 
consenting to the contract or representation as to 
incur liability; otherwise, separately. 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a 
partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more 
persons not actual partners, he is an agent of the persons 
consenting to such representation to bind them to the same 
extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in 
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the 
representation. Where all the members of an existing 
partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act 
or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the 
joint act or obligation of the person acting and the persons 
consenting to the representation. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-15. Rules determining rights and 
duties of partners. 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to 
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any 
agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether 
by way of capital or advances to the partnership 
property, and share equally in the profits and surplus 
remaining after all liabilities, including those to 
partners, are satisfied; and, except as provided in 
Subsection 48-1-12(2), must contribute towards the 
losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by 
the partnership according to his share in the profits. 
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect 
of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably 
incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of 
its business, or for the preservation of its business 
or property. 
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any 
payment or advance beyond the amount of capital which 
he agreed to contribute shall be paid interest from the 
date of the payment or advance. 
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital 
contributed by him only from the date when repayment 
should be made. 
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the partnership business. 
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in 
the partnership business, except that a surviving 
partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his 
services in winding up the partnership affairs. 
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without 
the consent of all the partners. 
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected 
with the partnership business may be decided by a 
majority of the partners; but no act in contravention 
of any agreement between the partners may be done 
rightfully without the consent of all the partners. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is an appeal from the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment on the issues raised in the 
Complaint, and from the District Court's ruling denying the 
Plaintiffs' two motions to file a second amended Complaint. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. The 
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this case on 
September 18, 1998 (R. at 1); and named as defendants therein 
Defendant Arnold; Defendant Larson; Duane R. Barney; Peter Lanto; 
Eric A. Rasmussen; and Gregory A. Page. Following discovery by 
the parties, and pursuant to the Court!s Orders filed November 3 
and November 10, 19991, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 
Complaint more than one year later, on November 9, 1999 (R. at 
216), naming as defendants only Defendant Arnold and Defendant 
Larson. 
Defendant Arnold filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
with respect to the First Cause of Action ("Breach of Joint 
Venture Agreement") ; with respect to the Third Cause of Action 
("Breach of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold1'); and with 
respect to the Fourth Cause of Action ("Punitive Damages") on or 
about May 30, 2000. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 3; R. at 361.) 
That motion was granted as to the Third and Fourth Causes of 
1It appears the Court entered two orders because the first 
order, filed November 3, 1999, was not served on Defendant 
Larson. 
5 
Action by the District Court in its Order of August 15, 2000.2 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 7; R. at 779.) 
The case was set for trial on August 28, 2000. Shortly 
after commencement of trial, however, the District Court 
declared a mistrial which is not at issue on this appeal. (Brief 
of Appellant, Addendum 12; R. at 962.) Following the mistrial 
and various evidentiary rulings by the District Court, the 
Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second amended complaint on 
September 1, 2000. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13; R. at 971.) 
Prior to the Court's ruling on that motion, the Plaintiffs filed 
a "Motion to Further Amend Complaint" on September 25, 2000. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16; R. at 1019.) Both motions to 
amend were denied by the Court's order dated November 8, 2000. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 21; R. at 1136.) 
On November 7, 2000, Defendant Larson filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the remaining claims in the First Amended 
Complaint —i.e., on the Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action (for 
alleged breach of the Joint Venture Agreement) and on the 
Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action (for alleged default of a 
trust deed note). (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 24; R. at 1048.) 
On November 30, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment with respect to alleged liability of the 
2While Defendant Norman did not join in Defendant Arnold's 
motion for partial summary judgment, the Court's dismissal of the 
Fourth Cause of Action for punitive damages with prejudice 
effectively disposed of that issue with respect to both 
defendants. 
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Defendants on the trust deed note. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
25; R. at 1148.) On December 13, 2000, Defendant Arnold also 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the first and second 
causes of action in the First Amended Complaint. (Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum 30; R. at 13 91.) 
In its order dated January 17, 2001, the District Court 
granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants, 
and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the 
Plaintiffs. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 34; R. at 1415.) This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs were the owners of 8.33 acres of realty 
located adjacent to North Highway 191 in Grand County, Utah. 
They operate a water park adjacent to this property. ( Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum 2; First Amended Complaint, fH 5, 6; R. at 
217. ) 
2. In 1995, the Plaintiffs met with Duane Barney, in 
Spanish Fork, Utah, to discuss a potential development project 
for a Holiday Inn to be located in Moab, Utah. (Norman Depo., 
13:12 — 14:7; R. at 1096-1097.) 
3. Mr. Barney advised Plaintiff Robert Norman that he had 
contacts, among whom he named Greg Page, and said that he had put 
together a proposal to construct another Holiday Inn in Spanish 
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Fork, Utah, and that he could assist the Plaintiffs in doing the 
same thing in Moab, Utah. (Norman Depo., 14:16-22; R. at 1097.) 
4. At a second meeting in Moab, Utah, Plaintiff Robert 
Norman met with Duane Barney, Greg Page, and Peter Lanto, to 
discuss the development proposal. Mr. Lanto was to be the 
builder on the project. (Norman Depo, 16:15 — 18:1; R. at 199-
1101.) Neither Duane Barney, Greg Page, nor Peter Lanto are 
parties herein. 
5. Greg Page proposed an agreement for the development of 
the Holiday Inn, prepared such an agreement, and submitted it to 
Plaintiff Robert Norman. (Norman Depo., 19:4-11; R. at 1102.) 
On March 15, 1995, the Plaintiffs and other persons, not 
including either of the Defendants herein, executed a document 
entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" ("the 
Joint Venture Agreement"). (R. at 17; R. at 1174.) Pursuant to 
the Joint Venture Agreement, the Plaintiffs contributed their 
8.33 acres of realty, referred to above, to the Joint Venture. 
(First Amended Complaint, Hl3., R. at 218 J 
6. The original Joint Venture partners were Plaintiff 
Robert Norman, Sr.; Plaintiff Diane Norman; Duane Barney; Peter 
Lanto; and Eric Rasmussen. (R. at 1178; Norman Depo. 27:6-10; R. 
at 1105.) In connection with the Plaintiffs1 participation in 
the Joint Venture, Greg Page was their principal contact. 
(Norman Depo., 61:18-25; R. at 1116.) Greg Page was the brother-
in-law of Eric Rasmussen, and Plaintiff Robert Norman did not 
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understand why Mr. Rasmussen became a joint venturer instead of 
Mr. Page. (Norman Depo., 18:16 — 19:3; R. at 1101-1102.) 
However, the Plaintiffs admit that Mr. Page acted "in the place 
of Rasmussen" in the Joint Venture. (First Amended Complaint, f 
11; R. at 217.) 
7. Each of the Joint Venture partners had different roles 
with respect to the joint venture. The Plaintiffs contributed 
the real property for the construction of a Holiday Inn Express 
in Moab, Utah. The other members of the Joint Venture were to 
contribute "expertise and consideration." (R. at 1179.) Mr. 
Lanto was to be the builder. (Norman Depo., 17:5 — 18:1; R. at 
1100-1101.) Mr. Barney was to be the manager of the project. 
(Norman Depo., 61:14-15; R. at 1116.) Mr. Barney and Mr. Page 
(who had not signed the joint venture agreement) sought financing 
for the project. (Norman Depo., 18:16 — 19:4; R. at 1101-1102.) 
8. Mr. Page, on behalf of an entity called 4-D 
Development, retained Western Empire Advisors, Inc., a company 
owned by Defendant Larson, to assist in obtaining financing for 
the project, and Larson in turn introduced the Joint Venture 
partners to Defendant Arnold, who subsequently became the lawyer 
for the joint venture. (Arnold Aff. % 6, R. at 365; Service 
Agreement, R. at 525.) Western Empire Advisors, Inc. ("WEA") , is 
not a party herein. 
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9. Arnold introduced the Joint Venture partners to Ann 
and Norman Young, who provided the short term financing. (Arnold 
Aff., H 7; R. at 365.) 
10. The Youngs agreed to made a short term loan for 
$160,000.00, payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with 
loan fees totaling 12 points. (Arnold Aff., R. at 364.) A 
promissory note in favor of the Youngs was executed by the 
Plaintiffs and by Duane R. Barney, Gregory A. Page, and Defendant 
Norman Me Larson. The promissory note was signed by the 
Defendant Larson at the behest of Defendant Arnold only after it 
was entered into by the other parties. (Larson Depo., 46:22-24; 
R. at 1134.) 
11. The Plaintiffs agreed to pledge their property as 
collateral for the loan, and signed a deed of trust in the 
Youngs' favor. (Arnold Aff. H 8; Trust Deed, R. at 26). The 
loan proceeds were placed into a money market account owned by 
WEA, the corporation owned by Defendant Larson. (Checking 
Account Deposit Slip, R. at 533.) 
12. On October 27, 1995, pursuant to a "Purchase 
Agreement," Mr. Lanto purported to sell his interest in the joint 
venture to Defendant Arnold and WEA, for $8,500.00. (Purchase 
Agreement, R. at 551.) 
13. Defendant Larson obtained uhe Holiday Inn franchise 
which he conveyed to the Joint Venture, and thereafter Defendant 
Larson sought to obtain the necessary financing for the project, 
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to no avail. (Larson Depo. 25:1-12, R. at 1131; Arnold Aff. % 9, 
R. at 366.) 
14. Defendant Arnold introduced the Plaintiffs to Jim 
Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off 
the Young note. (B. Norman Depo., 71:14 — 73:4, R. at 457-459; 
Assignment of Trust Deed, R. at 565.) At the closing, 
$212,000.00 of the sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for 
release of their trust deed on the property. (Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum 3, Arnold Aff. 1 10, R. at 366.) 
15. The joint venture agreement provides that " [a]dditional 
Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time 
upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers." (R. 
at 1174.) At no time did the Plaintiffs consent to Defendant 
Larson becoming a member of the joint venture. (Norman Depo, 
28:23 — 29:3, R. at 1106-1107.) However, Defendant Norman was 
advised by Defendant Arnold, as well as by Mr. Barney and Mr. 
Page, that he would receive a 25 percent equity interest in the 
project if he was successful in obtaining the needed financing. 
(Larson Depo. 59:6-20, R. at 1135.) The financing was never 
forthcoming. 
16. On May 9, 1996, Defendant Larson, as President of WEA, 
wrote to the Plaintiffs and proposed, inter alia, that his 
company, WEA, "pay off the lien of $160,000.00 that presently 
exists on the land designated for the motel;" that WEA "provide 
the financing for the construction of the motel and refinancing 
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and improvements of [the Plaintiffs'] water park;" and provide 
other services related to the construction of the motel if WEA 
were permitted to "joint venture the [Plaintiffs'] Waterpark and 
the development and construction of a 50 to 80 room motel to be 
located adjacent to the water park and on property presently 
owned by" the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs did not respond to this 
proposal. (Norman Depo., 89:11 — 90:25, R. at 1119-1120.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT 
LARSON WAS AT NO TIME A MEMBER OF THE MOAB LAND 
DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, HE COULD 
NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAVE VIOLATED ANY OF THE TERMS 
OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, 
Purely as a matter of statutory construction, the Defendant 
Larson could not have been a member of the Joint Venture because 
in Utah, joint venturers are treated the same as partners, and 
Utah law prohibits any person from becoming a partner without the 
consent of all other partners. It is beyond dispute in this case 
that the Plaintiffs, who were members of the Joint Venture, at no 
time consented to any membership by Defendant Larson in the Joint 
Venture. 
In addition to purely statutory constraints, the Joint 
Venture Agreement itself prohibited the addition of new members 
unless all of the then existing members consented. The 
Plaintiffs testified that Larson was never a member of the joint 
venture, and that was the Defendant Larson's understanding as 
12 
well. Consequently, Defendant Larson could not have violated any 
of the terms of the joint venture agreement and the District 
Court correctly granted him summary judgment on this issue. 
II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS WITH RESPECT TO A PROMISSORY 
NOTE EXECUTED BY HIM IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTIES. 
The Second Cause of Action alleges that the Defendant Larson 
is liable to the Plaintiffs because they sold the property they 
had earlier contributed to the joint venture and reduced the 
purchase price by "over $200,000" for the amount due on the 
promissory note held by the Youngs and executed by, among others, 
the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Larson. However, the Plaintiffs 
have failed to allege that they are third party beneficiaries 
under the note and, indeed, any such argument fails as a matter 
of law. They have also failed to allege in the First Amended 
Complaint any other legal theory of liability against the 
Defendant Larson which is cognizable in Utah as a cause of 
action. Instead, they merely allege that the terms of the note 
provide for joint and several liability in the event of a 
default, and that "defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen, 
Larson, and Arnold are each jointly and severally liable to the 
Plaintiffs for default." (First Amended Complaint, 1 52; R. at 
224.) There is no evidence in this case that any such default 
occurred and, if it did occur, any such default can only have run 
in favor of the Youngs and not the Plaintiffs. Under these 
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circumstances, the District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant Larson on this issue. 
XXI* THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WERE NOT ALLOWABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTRACT 
CLAIMS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
This case concerns the Plaintiffs' investment in the Moab 
Land Development Joint Venture. That investment failed. The 
only substantive causes of action in the First Amended Complaint 
relating to Defendant Larson — the claim that he breached the 
Joint Venture Agreement and that he is liable to the Plaintiffs 
based upon his execution of the promissory note — clearly sound 
in contract. Punitive damages are not allowable in Utah for 
breach of contract as a matter of law. 
IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST 
DEFENDANT LARSON IN THIS CASE. 
In the exercise of its broad discretion, the District Court 
properly declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to 
the facts of this case. Nor have the Plaintiffs offered any 
evidence which would support critical elements of equitable 
estoppel. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO FILE A SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The Plaintiffs' motions to amend their complaint were both 
untimely and prejudicial to the Defendants, since discovery had 
already been completed by all parties. Additionally, the 
proposed causes of action asserted in the proposed second amended 
complaint are futile. Consequently, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying those motions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT 
LARSON WAS AT NO TIME A MEMBER OF THE MOAB LAND 
DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE AND. CONSEQUENTLY, HE COULD 
NOT. AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAVE VIOLATED ANY OF THE TERMS 
OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, 
The original Complaint herein (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
1; R. at 1) was filed on September 18, 1998, and sets forth, in 
its First Cause of Action, that the Defendant Larson was a member 
of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture ("the Joint Venture") 
and breached that agreement. More than a year later, on November 
9, 1999, following numerous depositions and other extensive 
discovery, the Plaintiffs sought and received permission from the 
Court to file a First Amended Complaint (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum 2; R. at 216). But the First Cause of Action set forth 
therein is identical to the First Cause of Action in the original 
Complaint. There, the Plaintiffs allege that: (1) the members of 
the Joint Venture "at all relevant times" were the Plaintiffs, 
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Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, and 
Defendants Mark Arnold and Norman Larson; and (2) that the 
Defendants Arnold and Larson breached the Joint Venture Agreement 
(a) by failing to secure a Holiday Inn Franchise; (b) by failing 
to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property the 
Plaintiffs contributed to the Joint Venture, (c) by failing to 
contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the Joint 
Venture; (d) by using the Plaintiffs' property to secure a 
$160,000.00 loan, then using the loan proceeds for purposes 
unrelated to the Joint Venture and without the knowledge or 
consent of the Plaintiffs; and (e) by allowing themselves and 
Gregory Page to become members of the Joint Venture contrary to 
its provisions. 
While the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants were members 
of the Joint Venture "at all relevant times," it is clear that 
neither Defendant executed the Joint Venture Agreement (R. at 
1174), and thus neither of them were members at the inception of 
the venture. In Utah, joint ventures are subject to the same 
rules as partnerships. See, e.g., Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 
759 n.l (Utah 1984); Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. 
v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) . Thus, because " [n]o person can become a member of a 
partnership without the consent of all the partners," UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-1-15(7), it is equally impossible for any person to 
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become a member of a joint venture without the consent of all the 
joint venturers. There is simply no evidence in this case from 
which it could be concluded that any of the joint venturers 
consented to Defendant Larson's membership in the Joint Venture. 
Thus, Plaintiff Robert Norman testified in his deposition that he 
never gave his consent for any other individual to become a 
member of the Joint Venture. (Norman Depo., 28:23 — 29:3; R. at 
1106-1107.) This testimony is fully consistent with the 
deposition testimony of the Defendant Larson that he was not a 
member of the Joint Venture. (Larson Depo., 42:2-4. R. at 1133.) 
Except for the parties, none of the other members of the Joint 
Venture was deposed, nor was any other form of admissible 
evidence elicited from them, and thus the Plaintiffs are unable 
to demonstrate the extent to which, if at all, those other joint 
venturers consented to Defendant Larson joining the joint 
venture. 
The Joint Venture agreement itself, following the 
requirements of Utah law, provided that " [a]dditional joint 
venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon 
agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers." (R. at 
1174.) Without unanimous agreement of the existing joint 
venturers, therefore, it is clear that Defendant Norman could not 
have become a member. Significantly, Larson did, at one time, 
propose to the Plaintiffs that his company, Western Empire 
Advisors, Inc., become a member of a joint venture with them 
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related to the project, but the Plaintiffs never accepted that 
proposal. (Norman Depo. 89:14 — 90:16, R. at 1120-1121.) 
The leading case in Utah defining the elements essential to 
a joint venture is Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). 
There, the Court held that, to establish the existence of a joint 
venture 
there must be a community of interest in the performance of 
the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the 
subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share 
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the 
contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be 
sustained. 
Id. Notably, as to both Defendants, none of these elements are 
even alleged in the in the First Amended Complaint. Nor could 
they be properly alleged with respect to Defendant Larson. He 
clearly had no "joint proprietary interest in the subject 
matter," no "mutual right to control," no "right to share in the 
profits," and no "duty to share in any losses which may be 
sustained." As a matter of law, therefore, he was not a member 
of the Joint Venture and assumes no liability for any alleged 
breach of the joint venture agreement. 
Defendant Larson understood that he had the potential to 
become a member of the Joint Venture if he was successful in 
securing the necessary financing. He was advised by Defendant 
Arnold, as well as by Mr. Barney and Mr. Page, that he would 
receive a 25 percent equity interest in the project if he was 
successful in obtaining that financing. (Larson Depo. 59:13-20, 
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R. at 1135.) But the financing was never forthcoming, and thus 
his potential membership in the joint venture never materialized. 
The Plaintiffs, seeking recovery for an alleged breach of 
the joint venture agreement, seek recovery against Larson, who 
was not a member of the joint venture, but not against any of the 
persons who were among the original members of the joint venture. 
This is simply inexplicable. To whatever extent the Plaintiffs 
believe they may have a cause of action for breach of the joint 
venture agreement, any such cause of action necessarily runs 
against those who were actually members of the Joint Venture. 
Defendant Larson was simply not a such a member, nor is there 
even a scintilla of evidence in the record from which it can 
properly be concluded that the Plaintiffs were "approached by" 
Larson in 1995 with a proposal to develop the Holiday Inn 
property. (First Amended Complaint, % 7; R. at 217.) 
Finally, the Plaintiffs' theory that there was a breach of 
the joint venture agreement is fraught with other difficulties 
the Plaintiffs have simply chosen to ignore. It is clear that 
any such breach would create obligations belonging to the joint 
venture, which in law is treated as a partnership, Salt Lake Knee 
& Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v\ Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and any such 
obligations do not belong to the Plaintiffs individually, but to 
the Joint Venture, which has not been named as a party. It is 
hornbook law that partnership debts and obligations must be 
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satisfied by partnership assets to the extent any exist before 
any creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets. 
McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 758 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1988). While the Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any 
accounting of the partnership assets, it is very clear that at 
least one of those assets was the property they themselves 
contributed. In some unexplained fashion, that property was 
ultimately sold by the plaintiffs to a third party, evidently 
without obtaining any approval from the other members of the 
joint venture, let alone from Defendant Larson. Traditional 
concepts of partnership law would suggest that, in the event of a 
breach of the joint venture agreement, the Plaintiffs would be in 
a position to seek contribution from the other individual members 
of the joint venture to the extent partnership assets do not make 
them whole. Because Defendant Larson was not such a member, 
however, they would not, as a matter of law, be able to seek any 
such contribution from him. 
Traditional concepts of contract law also support this 
result, since mutual assent is the cornerstone upon which 
contracts are formed. See, e.g., Aquagen International, Inc. v. 
Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998); Vasels v. LoGuidice, 
740 P.2d 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . Here, none of the parties 
has acknowledged any such mutual assent, and thus it is simply 
beyond dispute that Defendant Norman was not a member of the 
joint venture and owed no duty as such to the Plaintiffs. See 
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Soule v. Weatherby, 118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the 
obligation assumed by the defendant is found his duty, and his 
failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach.") 
II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT. AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS WITH RESPECT TO A PROMISSORY 
NOTE EXECUTED BY HIM IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTIES. 
In their Second Cause of Action, — which the Plaintiffs 
frame as "Default of Trust Deed Note" — the Plaintiffs assert 
that they somehow sold their property which had previously been 
contributed to the Joint Venture, that the buyer was the 
successor-in-interest on the promissory note executed by 
Defendant Larson and the members of the Joint Venture, and that 
the purchase price of the property was "reduced by over $200,000 
that was then owing on the Note." They seek damages of "not less 
than" that amount. 
First, the promissory note is drawn, not in favor of the 
Plaintiffs, but in favor of Ann Young and Norman Young. (R. at 
26-27.) The Plaintiffs have not asserted that they were 
beneficiaries under that note or otherwise had any interest in it 
as obligees; rather, they were merely obligors with the Defendant 
Larson and others in the event of default. Thus, they have 
identified no cognizable legal theory pursuant to which Defendant 
Larson is liable to them for their alleged loss on the sale of 
the property. It is clear that they have failed to allege that 
they are beneficiaries under the note because any such allegation 
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fails both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. In Utah, 
promissory notes are treated as contracts between the parties, 
see, e.g., Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), and to have enforceable rights under a contract, the 
Plaintiffs must show that they were intended beneficiaries of the 
contract. Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999). No such showing has been made in this case, as 
indeed it could not be, since no language expressing any such 
intention is contained in the note itself and no other evidence 
has been offered by the Plaintiffs in support of any such 
intention. 
Second, the Plaintiffs offered nothing to show that there 
was any default and foreclosure with respect to the note at any 
time. Rather, apparently in anticipation of such a foreclosure, 
the Plaintiffs apparently withdrew the realty pledged for the 
loan from the Joint Venture assets, then sold that asset to a 
third party, Jim Winkler. The amount of the Young loan was paid 
off at that time, and the Plaintiffs now assert that they had a 
loss on the non-existent "default" and are entitled to collect 
damages from the Defendant Larson. It is very clear that 
assuming, arguendo, there had been a default of the promissory 
note, the Defendant Larson could have been liable, with the 
members of the Joint Venture, to the Youngs. But there is 
nothing in the voluminous record in this case to support any 
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theory that the loan was ever in default, that the Youngs ever 
sought to foreclose their trust deed, or that the Defendant 
Larson incurred any liability to the Plaintiffs for any alleged 
default. 
Rather, it is the members of the Joint Venture who incur a 
duty to indemnify the Plaintiffs for any payments they reasonably 
made to conduct the business of the joint venture or preserve its 
property pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-15(2). That statute 
provides that 
[t]he partnership must indemnify every partner in 
respect of payments made and personal liabilities 
reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper 
conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its 
business or property. 
Whether indemnification would be required of the other joint 
venturers under the facts of this case is problematical, as the 
question whether the loss on the sale of the property occurred in 
the conducting of joint venture business or for the preservation 
of its business or property is disputable. But there can be no 
dispute that Defendant Larson was not a member of the joint 
venture, and as a non-member, he clearly has no statutory duty of 
indemnification to the Plaintiffs in the amount of the trust deed 
note. . 
Most significantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify 
any duty — sounding in contract, in tort, or on any other basis 
— owed by Defendant Larson to the Plaintiffs sufficient to hold 
him liable for their alleged losses on the sale of their 
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property. Defendant was never a member of the joint venture; 
Defendant did not have any separate contractual arrangement with 
the Plaintiffs; and the Defendant did not participate in the 
negotiations leading up to the sale of the property or the sale 
itself. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs' cause of 
action is fatally flawed: baldly stated, neither in their 
original Complaint nor in their First Amended Complaint have they 
come forward with any cognizable legal theory setting forth a 
recognized cause of action against the Defendant Larson for their 
alleged losses. 
The Plaintiffs' claim as set forth in their First Amended 
Complaint is that the Defendant Larson is "jointly and severally 
liable to the Plaintiffs for default of the Note." (Complaint, % 
52; R. at 224, Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2.) On appeal, 
however, they abandon that argument to insist that Defendant 
Larson is liable for "a proportionate share of the liability 
under the trust deed note." (Brief of Appellant at 30.) With no 
citation to authority, they then suggest that the Plaintiffs are 
"entitled to contribution from the co-obligors as a matter of law 
and equity." Not only was this suggestion not raised in the 
First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs offer no argument at all 
in support of their new position. Accordingly, the Court should 
not consider this new issue. See MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 
947-948 (Utah 1998) . 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES WERE NOT ALLOWABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTRACT 
CLAIMS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE, 
Both of the substantive causes of action herein — one for 
an alleged breach of a joint venture agreement and one for an 
alleged default of a trust deed note — clearly sound in 
contract. It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that 
"punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract 
unless the breach amounts to an independent tort." See, e.g., 
Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 
1049 (Utah 1984); Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 19 P.3d 392 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). While the Plaintiffs have not alleged any 
such "independent tort/ they suggest that the factual 
allegations in their First Amended Complaint amount to claims for 
fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional 
interference with existing and potential economic relations. (R. 
at 766.) A review of the Fourth Cause of Action in the First 
Amended Complaint (R. at 228), however, makes abundantly clear 
that none of these claims has even remotely been alleged. 
Instead, the Plaintiffs allege only that the actions taken by the 
Defendants were "knowing" and "intentional." At best, these 
allegations may suggest that the contract violations allegedly 
committed by the Defendants were willful and malicious. In Utah, 
however, even willful and malicious breaches of contract terms do 
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not, as a matter of law, support a claim for punitive damages. 
Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983) . 
In paragraph 89 of the First Amended Complaint (R. at 229), 
it is alleged "that the Defendants knowingly and intentionally 
lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and 
their intentions . . .". This language plainly does not rise to 
the level of stating a cause of action for the tort of 
intentional or even negligent misrepresentation. 
This Court has described the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation as follows: 
[T]he tort of negligent misrepresentation . . . 
provides that a party injured by reasonable reliance 
upon a party's careless or negligent misrepresentation 
of a material fact may recover damages resulting from 
that injury when the second party had a pecuniary 
interest in the transaction, was in a superior position 
to know the material facts, and should have reasonably 
foreseen that the injured party was likely to rely upon 
the fact. 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel1, 713 P.2d 55, 59 
(Utah 1988). Here, not only have the Plaintiffs failed to set 
forth any of the alleged misrepresentations in their First 
Amended Complaint, they have also failed to allege their own 
reasonable reliance, failed to allege the Defendant Larson's 
superior position to know the material facts, and failed to 
allege the reasonable forseeability of the alleged injury. 
This Court has also described the elements of fraudulent 
misrepresentation as follows: 
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which 
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the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon 
it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury 
and damage. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 123 9, 1246 (Utah 1980) . Other than the 
bare allegation that some otherwise unidentified 
misrepresentation occurred, the Plaintiffs have failed to make 
factual allegations concerning any of these critical elements. 
Reading the allegations of the First Amended Complaint most 
favorably to the Plaintiffs, they have simply failed to raise any 
cognizable tort claims upon which a cause of action for punitive 
damages could be predicated. 
Notably, it is the alleged contract breach itself which must 
constitute an "independent tort" to support a claim for punitive 
damages. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 683 
P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984) see also Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). None of the facts alleged in the First 
Cause of Action in support of the claimed breach of the Joint 
Venture Agreement contain any suggestion that a negligent or 
fraudulent misrepresentation by the Defendants caused the alleged 
breach. Instead, the Plaintiffs allege that the breach occurred 
because the Defendants (1) failed to secure the Holiday Inn 
franchise; (2) failed to develop, manage and maintain the 
property contributed by the Plaintiffs to the Joint Venture; (3) 
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failed to contribute consideration, expertise, or anything else 
of value to the Joint Venture; (4) used the Plaintiffs' property 
to secure a loan which was expended for purposes unrelated to the 
Joint Venture; and (5) allowed themselves and Mr. Page to become 
members of the Joint Venture "contrary to its provisions." 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2, First Amended Complaint, 11 41-
44, R. at 222-223.) Whether considered independently or 
together, none of these allegations constitute the "independent 
tort" necessary for the imposition of punitive damages. 
A similar analysis is appropriate with respect to the Second 
Cause of Action, for alleged Default of the Trust Deed Note. 
None of the allegations relating to the alleged default can 
reasonably be read as establishing some "independent tort" upon 
which a claim of punitive damages could be based. 
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the 
District Court properly dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action, for 
punitive damages, with prejudice. 
IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST 
DEFENDANT LARSON IN THIS CASE. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants should be equitably 
estopped to deny their membership in the Joint Venture and 
liability under the trust deed note because 
as members of the joint venture, or as professionals 
working on behalf of the joint venture, [they] 
intentionally violated the provisions of the joint 
venture agreement and ultimately, directly caused its 
dissolution. They nevertheless publicly continued to 
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act as members and representatives of a joint venture 
including the plaintiffs thereafter. The plaintiffs 
were aware of and acquiesced to the defendants' 
activities on behalf of the venture, and now are in the 
position of having to fully absorb a loss in excess of 
$200,000 and control of their adjoining property if the 
defendants are allowed to escape liability for their 
conduct.3 
(Brief of Appellants at 29.) The Plaintiffs make no citation to 
the record in support of any of these assertions. 
Two preliminary difficulties with the Plaintiffs1 argument 
must be pointed out at once. First, it should be noted that the 
Plaintiffs' argument plainly addresses only the First Cause of 
Action in the First Amended Complaint (the alleged breach of the 
Joint Venture kgreement^ and not the Second Cause of Action ^the 
alleged default on the trust deed note). Consequently, although 
they have purported to raise the equitable estoppel argument with 
respect to the alleged default on the trust deed note (Brief of 
Appellant at 4), they are not entitled to be heard on that issue 
because they have not offered any argument. See, e.g., Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 14 P.3d 105, 114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000) ("Brookside has not complied with our briefing rules 
requiring a proper legal argument "with citations to the 
authorities . . . relied on. ' We therefore decline to address 
this argument." [Citations omitted.]) 
3The quoted language constitutes virtually the entire 
argument of the Plaintiffs with respect to the equitable 
estoppel issue. 
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Second, the Plaintiffs argue that the original joint venture 
was dissolved through the fault of the Defendants and that the 
Defendants then became members of some other joint venture whose 
membership is unstated. None of these assertions are anywhere 
included in the First Amended Complaint and they are not 
appropriately before the Court unless the Plaintiffs prevail on 
their argument that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying the Plaintiffs' motion to further amend their complaint. 
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken 
or not taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) 
injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077 (Utah 
1999). While the Plaintiffs have clearly alleged they were 
injured by the alleged breach of the Joint Venture Agreement, 
they have offered no evidence to suggest that Defendant Larson 
made any inconsistent statement or that they took any reasonable 
action or inaction based upon any specific statement by Defendant 
Larson. While the Plaintiffs suggest that Defendant Larson 
"represented himself as a partner," they make no citation to the 
record in support of this claim. Even had he made such a 
representation, however, it is obviously required that the 
representation must have been communicated to the Plaintiffs in 
some fashion before they could rely on it to their detriment. 
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See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-13 (1) . There is simply nothing in the 
record which would even remotely support a finding that any such 
communication occurred. 
It is true that Defendant Arnold, on behalf of himself and 
Western Empire Advisors, Inc., purported to purchase the interest 
of Peter Lanto in the Holiday Inn Venture. The purchase 
agreement is dated October 27, 1995. (R. at 551.) There is, 
however, nothing in the record to suggest that the purported 
purchase by Western Empire Advisors was ever communicated to the 
Plaintiffs. Even more damaging to the Plaintiffs' position, 
Western Empire Advisors is not a party herein and cannot be 
deemed the alter ego of Defendant Larson without a showing (1) 
that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between the 
corporation and the individual that the separate personalities of 
the company and the individual no longer exist and should be 
disregarded; and (2) that the observance of the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. See, e.g., Norman 
v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 
1979). The Plaintiffs have offered no evidence whatsoever in 
support of any such claim, nor did they even bother to plead the 
alter ego theory in their First Amended Complaint. 
Shortly after the purported purchase of Lanto!s interest, on 
November 3, 1995, Defendant Larson wrote a letter to Bruce Holman 
of Trust Guarantee Corporation on the letterhead of Western 
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Empire Advisors stating that " [w]e are very anxious to proceed 
since we own an equity position in both projects and I have the 
Holiday Express Franchise." (R. at 555.) Again, however, it is 
clear that the parties being referred to are the Defendant Arnold 
and Western Empire Advisors, not the Defendant Larson in any 
individual capacity. 
The District Court has broad discretion whether to apply the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel to a given case. See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997); 
Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) . Here, the Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence 
to the trial court in support of their estoppel argument as to 
Defendant Larson. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said 
that the Court abused its broad discretion. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO FILE A SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in this case 
on September 18, 1998. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 1; R. at 
1.) Following extensive discovery, including depositions of all 
parties, the Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on 
November 9, 1999. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 2; R. at 216.) 
The case was set for trial on August 28, 2000, but the Court 
declared a mistrial on that date. (Brief of Appellant, Addendums 
12, 38; R. at 962; R at 1432.) 
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Shortly following the mistrial, on September 1, 2000, the 
Plaintiffs filed their Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13; R. at 971.) In that motion, 
the Plaintiffs proposed to amend their First Amended Complaint 
for the following purposes: 
(1) to add the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a 
party plaintiff; 
(2) to assert claims of "professional negligence and 
liability as agent" against Defendant Arnold, and against 
Defendant Larson and Western Empire Advisors, Inc., as "financial 
expert;" 
(3) to add Mr. Rasmussen and Mr. Lanto as defendants; and 
(4) to assert claims against Mr. Lanto and Mr. Rasmussen 
arising under the Joint Venture Agreement. 
(R. at 973.) 
The Defendant Larson filed his objection to the Plaintiffs' 
motion on or about September 19, 2000 (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum 15, R. at 1013); and the Defendant Arnold filed his 
opposition to the motion on or about September 16, 2000 (Brief of 
Appellee Larson, Addendum C; R. at 983). Inexplicably, prior to 
any ruling of the District Court on their motion, the Plaintiffs 
filed a Motion to Further Amend Complaint on September 25, 2000. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16, R. at 1019.) The stated 
purpose of the proposed further amendment to the Complaint was 
"to allow the Plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of 
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liability: (1) under the joint venture agreement; and (2) 
individual liability." (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 16, R. at 
1021.) 
The District Court denied both the Motion to File 2nd 
Amended Complaint and the Motion to Further Amend the Complaint 
in its Order dated November 8, 2000. (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum 21; R. at 113 6.) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a 
pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires," but, 
as this Court has noted, "the liberality of the rule is not 
without limit . . .". Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 
1960). More recently, the Court has suggested" that "[t]his 
liberal application of rule 15(a), however, is limited when the 
opposing party does not have adequate opportunity to respond to 
the amended pleadings." Tiwm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 
(Utah 1993). Here, the Plaintiffs sought their second amendment, 
and their "further amendment," long after the opposing parties 
had completed their discovery, designated their witnesses, 
identified their exhibits, and otherwise fully prepared the case 
for trial. Indeed, the proposed amendments came after the trial 
was commenced and aborted on August 28, 2000. 
Resolution of motions to amend are left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1182. A primary 
consideration in determining whether an amendment should be 
allowed is whether the opposing party is "put to unavoidable 
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prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he has not had 
time to prepare. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 
(Utah 1983). Finally, a motion to amend should not be granted 
where the pleader does not set forth a legally sufficient claim, 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 1996), as any such 
amendment would be futile. 
The proposed amendments would add new claims and new parties 
which would significantly alter the issues in this case. 
However, the precise language of the Plaintiffs1 proposed 
amendments are not part of the record in this case, because the 
Plaintiffs elected not to file their proposed Second Amended 
Complaint and their proposed Further Amendment with the District 
Court.4 It is thus impossible to determine from the language of 
the proposed amendments themselves whether they are legally 
insufficient or futile. 
4Curiously, the Plaintiffs did serve a copy of the proposed 
Second Amended Complaint on the Defendant Larson on or about 
September 1, 2000. Only upon reviewing the record in this case 
in preparation for writing this brief did Defendant Larson's 
Counsel discover that the proposed second amendment was not filed 
with the Court and was thus not made part of the record. The 
same is true with respect to the Plaintiffs' proposed "Further 
Amendment," a copy of which was served on counsel for Defendant 
Larson on or about September 25, 2000. For whatever reasons, the 
Plaintiffs have elected not to make these documents part of the 
record. "Evidence not available to the trial judge cannot be 
added to the record on appeal." Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 455-456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Condor v. A.L. 
Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). This follows from the language of Rule 11(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows correction or 
modification of the record to reflect what the record "truly 
discloses . . . occurred in the Trial Court." 
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As this Court has recently noted, "[t]he well-established 
abuse of discretion standard of review requires us to "presume 
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary, '" In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074, 1085 (Utah 2000), citing Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-535 (Utah 1984). It is the burden of 
the appellants to provide the reviewing court with an adequate 
record on appeal to prove their allegations, Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) . When crucial matters are not included in 
the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court. InterjnoiLntain Power Agency v. 
Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 
1985). In light of the Plaintiffs' failure to submit an adequate 
record, they cannot prevail on this issue and the District 
Court's exercise of its broad discretion must be sustained. 
At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend on 
October 10, 2000 (R. 1430), the Plaintiffs argued only that they 
should be able to amend the First Amended Complaint to add new 
parties, Western Empire Advisors and Pete Lanto. The Plaintiffs 
argued that, because the Defendants had suggested these parties 
were indispensable to any resolution of the Plaintiffs' claims, 
they should be permitted to add these new parties after the close 
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of discovery and after the mistrial. (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum 36, 10/10/2000 Hearing, Tr. 6:18 — 7:17, R. at 1430.) 
Significantly, the Plaintiffs offer no explanation whatsoever for 
why the proposed amendments were not sought in a timely fashion. 
This Court has denied a motion to amend under similar 
circumstances, where a party had already gone to the expense of 
discovery and preparing for trial, had relied on the opposing 
party's pleadings filed long before the trial, and had responded 
to discovery with specificity, setting forth all relevant facts, 
events, and dates. Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 
P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). The denial of a motion to amend is 
particularly appropriate where, as here, the party seeking to 
amend alleges no surprise, discovery of new evidence, or any 
other justification for the delay in seeking the amendment. Id; 
see also Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 
590, 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' motions to 
amend should be denied because the proposed amendments came 
very late in the process. If I have any discretion to 
grant, I think I should do so only under circumstances 
where the equities overwhelmingly favor granting the 
amendment. And in this case, it seems to me that these 
facts were known earlier than right at trial, that what 
is — what is really placing the plaintiff [sic] in the 
bind is a failure to predict what the ruling would be 
on legal issues that the Court has made, and I think 
those might have been predicted better. 
Also, the — there certainly would be expense to 
the defendants in preparing for trial with the expanded 
claims, and they could prepare, but it would be 
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expensive to do so. And I also think, as Mr. Lalli has 
argued, that there is real doubt about the viability of 
these claims and, although they may not be subject to 
attack on a motion for summary judgment, the likelihood 
of their succeeding is significantly less than 50 
percent, particularly the — in effect, a derivative 
partner claim on behalf of the limited partnership is 
— or on behalf of the joint venture is something that 
I'm aware of no authority to support. It's an analogy 
to the derivative actions by shareholders. This may be 
the case where the Supreme Court would say, yes, it 
should — there should be such a derivative action, but 
there' s some — they are some legal theories that have 
not yet been approved, as far as I know, by any 
Appellate Courts in Utah. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum 36, 10/10/2000 Hearing, Tr. 48:19 
—49:19 , R. at 1430.) It is clear from the District Court's 
ruling that the Court exercised its discretion to deny any 
further amended complaint because those amendments were (a) 
untimely; and (b) prejudicial to the Defendants. Because the 
District Court's ruling is fully in accord with the law of this 
jurisdiction, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the Plaintiffs' motion. 
The "derivative partner claim" referenced by the District 
Court relates to the Plaintiffs' efforts to add the Moab Land 
Development Joint Venture as a party in their Motion to File 2rici 
Amended Complaint. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 13, R. at 973.) 
That claim is one of many which was not addressed by the 
Plaintiffs at oral argument and, as noted above, the Plaintiffs 
have also declined to make their proposed Second Amended 
Complaint or their Further Amendment part of the record in this 
case. This makes any proper analysis of their proposed 
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amendments virtually impossible. In any event, while this Court 
has permitted corporate principles concerning derivative actions 
to be applied to limited partnerships, Arndt v. First Interstate 
Bank, 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999), Defendant Larson has discovered 
no case where such a cause of action has been applied to general 
partnerships or to joint ventures such as the one involved in 
this case. There is simply no authority for the Plaintiffs to 
attempt to bring any suit on behalf of the joint venture without 
joining each of the joint venturers as plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs also propose to assert a new cause of action 
against both Defendant Arnold and Defendant Larson for 
"professional negligence and liability as agent against Mark 
Arnold (as counsel) and Norman Larson and/or Western Empire 
Advisors (as financial expert)." (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
13, R. at 973.) While the precise nature of this new cause of 
action is unclear, it appears that the Plaintiffs would seek to 
allege that "Larson and/or Western Empire Advisors" entered into 
a contractual arrangement to secure funding for the Joint 
Venture; that Defendant Larson (or proposed Defendant Western 
Empire Advisors) had some fiduciary duty to the Joint Venture as 
a financial consultant; and that Defendant Larson (or proposed 
Defendant Western Empire Advisors) is on that basis liable to the 
plaintiffs for their alleged losses. The primary difficulty with 
any such cause of action is that contractual obligations do not 
ordinarily give rise to fiduciary obligations because "the rights 
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and duties of parties to a contract may generally be freely 
transferred, parties may act for their own interests during the 
execution of a contract, and they have no duty of loyal 
representation of the opposing party . . .". Semenov v. Hill, 
982 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1999). But there is an even greater 
difficulty with the Plaintiffs' proposed cause of action. The 
Plaintiffs appear to assert that WEA was the "agent" of the Joint 
Venture, and the law is clear that "[t]o be an agent, a person 
must be authorized by another to "act on his behalf and subject 
to his control.'" Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 
1269 (Utah 1998) . The Plaintiffs have come forward with no 
evidence from which it could properly be concluded that the Joint 
Venture at any time provided any such authorization to the 
Defendant Larson or WEA. To be sure, there is a "Service 
Agreement" pursuant to which WEA agrees to "arrange financing" for 
the benefit of an entity called 4-D Development, (R. at 525) but 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that 4-D Development is 
in any way associated with the Moab Land Development Joint 
Venture or authorized to bind third parties on its behalf. Under 
these circumstances, it is clear that no agency relationship 
exists between the Joint Venture and WEA. Further, even if WEA 
undertook some duty as agent of the Joint Venture, it is 
incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to demonstrate the extent of that 
duty and the fashion in which it was violated. Id. at 1270. 
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This the Plaintiffs have failed to do. Thus, the proposed 
"professional liability" cause of action in the Second Amended 
Complaint fails as a matter of law. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs also propose to amend their 
complaint to add Western Empire Advisors, Inc., as a party 
defendant in this case. Again, however, the Plaintiffs have 
failed to set forth why they have failed to seek the addition of 
WEA in a timely fashion. Virtually all of the relevant documents 
the Plaintiff sought and received in this case in discovery from 
the Defendant Larson make very clear that he acted for and on 
behalf of Western Empire Advisors. (R. at 524, 525-528, 529, 
530, 531, 534, 535, 539, 540, 541, 542, 545, 547, 548, 551, 
555,556, 557,558, 559, 563). Having provided no explanation for 
their lack of timeliness, the Plaintiffs cannot show that the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying their motion to 
amend. See, e.g., Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 
854 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to any of the appealed issues herein, the District Court 
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants and denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment. Further, the District Court did not abuse its 
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discretion in declining to apply principles of equitable estoppel 
in this case, nor did it abuse its discretion in declining to 
allow the Plaintiffs to file a Second Amended Complaint. It is 
respectfully submitted that the District Court's rulings herein 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
18*1 DATED this day of June, 2001 
VW*(J. fjz^k^ 
James C. Haskins /^  c^ c^  
Attorney for Defendant 
Norman M. Larson 
l(fofci-fci_ 
Thomas N. \Thompson 
At torney fosi defendant 
Norman M. Larson 
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A. No, sir, I was not successful in arranging 
financing for the project. However, I did receive 
commitments to fund the project but it was never funded. 
Q. Who did you receive the commitments from? 
A. National Acceptance Corporation. 
Q. Anyone else? 
A. Not as a commitment, no. 
Q. How much commitment did you receive from National 
Acceptance? 
Ac They said that they would fund $8 million on this 
project and the Holiday Express in Park City, Jeremy Ranch, 
that 4-D Development was also working on. 
Q. What was 4-D Development? 
A. That was the original entity that was to joint 
venture with Mr. Norman in building a Holiday Express in 
Moab, Utah. 
Q. What kind of entity was it? 
A. I think it was a corporation. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know who was involved in it? 
A. You have documentation to that effect. I don't 
recall. I know three people that were involved, Greg Page, 
Duane Barney and Pete Lanto* 
Q. Do you think there were others? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did the Park City project go forward? 
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Ann M. Love, Certified Court Reporter 
there just three plaintiffs? 
A. There would have been three plaintiffs. 
Q. Who were the others? 
A. Fellow named Allen Williams, he's from Bountiful. 
And the third one was from Phoenix and I don't recall his 
name. I do believe that Mr. Williams did file suit. 
Q. Do you know what the result of it was? 
A. I don't. 
Q. So back to this commitment business, I'm not 
asking you a legal question, although it's going to sound 
like one. If a funding entity gives you a commitment to 
provide funds and then doesn't do it, do you believe that you 
have a valid claim against that funding entity? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there anything that you are aware of that 
would have made the claim in this instance not valid or less 
valid? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You mentioned that you were involved in other 
projects in the Moab area. What are they? 
A. Well — off the record, okay? Can we do that? 
MR. RUSSELL: All right. You just want to talk 
to your attorney? Sure, go ahead. 
(Off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: Back on the record. Thank you. 
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Ann M. Love, Certified Court Reporter 
We are presently working on a 109 unit 
condominium project for a fellow named Richard Zinn, Z-i-n-n, 
Zinn & Associates in Moab on the golf course. We anticipate 
financing today« 
Q. That's actually out in Spanish Valley, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Any others? 
A. Yes. We were working with Mr. Jack Dunlop on 
putting a hotel convenience store together on his property, 
just north of Mr. Norman's, right on the corner there. 
Q. Corner of what? 
A. The highway going to Grand Junction and the 
highway going to Moab. Okay? The southeast corner. 
Q. You said we. 
A. Myself and several other people that were wanting 
to do a development there. One of them was Mr. Zinn, Dick 
Zinn. 
Q. Any of the other parties involved in this 
litigation? 
A. No. 
Q. Is that project still ongoing? 
A. I stopped the project when I got the claim, or 
the Complaint, because we were trying to tie in 
Mr. Norman's property and see if we could partially recoup 
some of the money that was lost through his land. There 
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1 part of the joint venture? 
2 A. I was never a part of the joint venture because 
3 was unable to provide financing. But I did provide the 
4 franchise in my name. 
5 Q. Provided it to who? 
6 A. The joint venture. It was assumed that the 
7 franchise, once the funding was in place, would be the 
8 franchise for the project. 
9 Q. Did you ever transfer the franchise to the joint 
10 venture or to any other party other than yourself? 
11 A. Yes, I did. 
12 Q. When did you do that? 
13 A. It was in 1996 when I was requested to do so, so 
14 that they could keep the franchise, they being Mr.* Page, 
15 Mr. Arnold, and Mr. Barney. 
16 Q. Where was- Bob Norman in all this? 
17 A. Mr. Barney and Mr. Page communicated with 
18 Mr. Norman directly. I wasn't privy to do that. I had met 
19 with Mr. Norman, with Mr. Page, Mr. Arnold, with Mr. Barney 
20 on one occasion. And we looked at the project, we went up to 
21 his home and spent about an hour, hour-and-a-half, and left. 
22 That was the only time that Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney, Mr. Page, 
23 and myself collectively have met with Mr. Norman. 
24 Q. Were you requested to obtain this franchise? 
25 A. Yes. 
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for that franchise? 
A. Reimbursed, yes. 
(Deposition Exhibit 4 marked for identification.) 
Q. This is Exhibit 4. That's a note secured by deed 
of trust, deed of trust is Exhibit 3. The note is also dated 
and signed June 27, 1995. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q, Have you seen that before? 
A. It was a — I had seen it. It was an addendum to 
the Complaint. That's the first time I recall seeing it 
specifically. 
Q. Did you see your signature on the document that 
was the addendum to. the Complaint? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Is that your signature? 
A.- It is. 
Q. So you must have seen it before that? 
A. I must have but I don't recall. 
Q. You are not denying that it was your signature? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know when you signed it? 
A. I don't specifically know when I signed it. I 
recall that the Youngs wanted me to sign the note also after 
the fact, which I did, at the request of Mr. Arnold. They 
were his clients. So it was an added security for those 
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the joint venture, they wouldn't have honored it. 
Q. Holiday Inn wouldn't have? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. How about my question? 
A. What's the question again? 
Q. Having been reimbursed for the franchise fee, 
whether or not it was still in your name, wouldn't it be fair 
to say that you had no longer any investment in the joint 
venture? 
A. I can't answer that. I think it's speculation. 
I mean, I don't know. 
Q. Well, then — 
A. I assumed that I didn't have any — equity in the 
joint venture because I hadn't provided financing yet for the 
project. Okay? So, no, I didn't have, it's my understanding 
I didn't have — I wasn't pari: of the joint venture at the 
time. 
Q. What was your deal if you were able to put 
together financing, what would you have received for that? 
A. Approximately 25 percent equity in the project. 
Q. And was there something in writing that was 
provided to you that said that? 
A. I don't recall. I don't have documentation to 
that effect. 
Q. Let's return to Exhibit 1 for a minute. It's the 
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seen documentation to that effect. What you showed me was an 
exhibit of Moab Land Development Joint Venture's, and the 
first time I saw that was when the Complaint came in. I had 
no knowledge of this document or these people, until that 
time. 
Q. Okay. On page 1 of the service agreement — 
A. Yes, sir. 
: Q. — at the bottom is equity? 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did that mean? 
A. That we're a lender, provide funding for the 
project. It was assumed that they would have to give up 40 
percent of the borrowers' equity. It says 40 percent in the 
borrowing entity until the principal is reduced by 50 
percent. So they would have to give 40 percent until the 
principal of the loan was reduced to 50 percent of the 
original amount, or 3.5 million, at which time the equity 
would drop to 10 percent to the lender. 
Q. That would be, for example, the bank or wherever 
the funds came from? 
A. Whoever it was. And then going down to the next 
page — J 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. — after WEA fee it says: Or any such terms and 
conditions that are mutually agreeable to borrower, the 
71 
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A. We have Robert Jr. is the general manager. 
Robert Jr./'our son, is the general manager. He 
does the day-to-day detail work and makes all those 
decisions. 
Q. Do you own any other businesses? 
A. No. 
Q. Whose idea was it to establish the 
waterpark business? 
A. Our family. 
Q. I'd like to turn our attention then to the 
events that bring us to this case. And when I refer 
to the Holiday Inn Express project that was involved 
in this case, I'll refer to it as the Moab Holiday 
inn project just so we're on common ground. Where 
did the idea for a Holiday Inn come from? 
A. We discussed it and we went to Spanish Fork 
and saw a Holiday Inn Express there, and made our 
approach originally with Duane Barney, who was 
running the Holiday Inn Express there. That's how 
we got started. 
Q. What led you to come up with that idea in 
your family for that business? 
A, Well, Holiday Inn, I've stayed in Holiday 
14 
Inns, and they have a procedure of allowing kids to 
come into the Holiday Inn, and so it just played in 





When did you go to Spanish Fork to speak 
. Barney? 
It was approximately in 1992- I don't know 















Do you remember the season? Was it winter? 
Well, it's when I first met Duane Barney. 
How did you learn that Mr. Barney was 
the Holiday Inn in Spanish Fork? J 
He showed me his business card. 1 
And when was that? Or let me clarify, when J 
first time you met Mr. Barney? J 
I'd say in 1992. 
And what did you discuss at that first I 
with Mr. Barney? J 
He said he could help us. He had the I 
, and he had put together a proposal to J 
.th on a new Holiday Inn Express there, and 





Did he say who his associates were? 1 
At the first meeting I don't recall. 1 
Was this meeting in person? J 
16 
A, I don't recall. I donft remember. Nothing 
was taking place, except that he was going to come 
J down here. 1 
Q. So 'you sat a time and a date for him to 







1 Ifm just 
the year 
Well, it was imminent shortly after our J 
he was coming down. 1 
As we've discussed this meeting, has it 
id your recollection about what time of the 
1992 it would have taken place? I 
I would think it was early. Early in 1992. I 
. guessing at those years. I think '92 was J 
1
 I met with Duane Barney. But it was the J 













When did you first meet Greg Page? 1 
He came down with Duane Barney. J 
So would that have been the next meeting? J 
The next meeting, yes. 1 
With those gentlemen was when they came J 
Moab? 
Right. J 
And when was that? I 
I don't know. I 
Soon after the meeting? I 
Soon after, yes. | 
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Q. Within a month? 
A. I would think so, 
Q. Who was present at that meeting besides 
Barney, Pag-^  and yourself? 
A. I think Mr. Lanto. Mr. Pete Lanto. 
Q. Anybody else? 
A. I donft recall at that point, no. 
Q. What did you discuss at that meeting? 
A. The framework of a partnership. 
Q. You discussed forming a partnership? 
A. Right. 
Q. And do you recall what the details of that 
partnership were as discussed at that meeting? 
A. That we would be—we would have an interest 
in the partnership. In our partnership. 
MR. RUSSELL: Are you finished? Are you 
finished with your answer? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. That's it. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) I'm sorry. I looked like 
you were deep in thought still. 
A. I was trying to think. 
Q. So the meeting in Moab then that we've just 
discussed, was the first time you met Mr. Lanto? 
A. Right. 
Q. And how did he fit in the picture? 
13 
A, He was going to be the builder. 
Q. Was he someone then that Page and Barney 
brought down? 
A. Right. They brought in as the builder. 
Q. Do you recall him discussing his experience 
as a builder or his qualifications? 
A. He asked about the—I .told him we had a 
topography map that we had flown, and I could pile 
up some--he asked if I could put some profiles 
together, detailed profiles, for him to base his 
site study. And so—which I did. I made a series 
of cross-sections across the property we1re talking 
about, mailed it to him. 
Q. Mailed it to him after this meeting? 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you know someone by the name of Eric 
Rasmussen? 
A. Duane Barney—I mean Greg Page mentioned 
Eric Rasmussen, and that he was his—Greg Page's 
brother-in-law. Fqr some reason he was going to be 
on the thing instead of Greg Page. And as far as 
I'm concerned, I didn't know what the reason was. 
Q. When you say on the thing, you mean what? 
A. On the contract. On our agreement. 
Q. But you don't know why? 
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A. I donft know why. He didn't—he just said 
he just was a trustworthy individual, his 
brother-in-law. 
Q. Is 'there anything else you can recall about 
that meeting in Moab that we've just discussed? 
A- They were going to send the agreement back 
to us, which we looked at. 
Q. Who proposed the idea of entering into an 
agreement? 
A. Well, Greg Page and—had to get it in 
writing. 
Q. Have you ever engaged in any business, 
other business, with any of these gentlemen, Barney, 
Page, Lanto, other than this? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
(Exhibit No. 13 marked.) 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what's been 
marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 13. 
A. What does that say? 
MR. RUSSELL: It says topography map, 
roadway feasibility, signs and code it looks like. 
Let him ask a question. 




A. I believe that's right. 
Q. Will you turn with me to the signature page 
again. '' 
A. Okay. 
Q. Did these individuals here reflected on the 
signature page, represent all of the members of the 
joint venture? 
A. I never thought about it, but Ifm sure it 
must have been. 
MR. RUSSELL: Can you read who they are? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I can read them. 
MR. RUSSELL: All right. You don't have 
to. I just want to make sure you can. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Were there any other 
agreements that you entered into besides this one? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't recall? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. On Schedule A of this agreement it sets 
forth the percentages and contributions. 
A. Right. That's Schedule A. Excuse me. 
Q. Schedule A. Do you recall what the 
expertise and consideration was to be for Mr. Barney 
and Mr. Rasmussen on behalf of Mr. Page? 
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A. No. I don't recall. 
Q. Did they tell you at the time this 
agreement was signed, what that expertise and 
consideration was going to be? 
A. No. I'm sorry, I didn't get that 
information. 
Q. Will you turn with me to the front page of 
the document, please. Looking down at paragraph 1.7 
there on the bottom, additional joint venturers. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you had a chance it read that? 
A. Additional joint venturers may, that's all 
I can see. 
MR. RUSSELL: Says, "Additional joint 
venturers may be added to the joint venture at any 
time upon agreement of all of the then-existing 
joint venturers." 
THE WITNESS: That's right. I see that. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Do you recall reading that 
provision when you entered into this agreement? 
A. I'm sure I read it, but I don't recall the 
details of that. 
Q. Did you ever give your consent for any 








They never asked me. 
So is your answer no? 
Yes. No. The answer is no. 
Thank you. 
(Exhibit No. 14 marked. ) 
(BY MR. HOWE) Handing you 
marked as Exhibit 14. I'll ask you 






No, I don't. 




as part of your document product 
to Norman Larsen's request, 



















the water well. Is that the lar 
had referenced* earlier? 
That's right. Yes. 
Was that to entail a development 
water well? 
A. Well, we didn't talk about 







1 I MR. RUSSELL: That's been asked and 
2 answered twice. 
3 THE WITNESS: That's right. Yes. It would 
4 be the same I was referring to. 
5 Q. (BY MR. HOWE) That last sentence there, 
6 I'm looking again at Exhibit 19 regarding the buyout 
7 of Mr. Pete Lanto' position in the proposed project, 
•8 what was your understanding as of December 6th or 
9 7th, 1995, regarding a buyout? 
10 A. I don't know how it was going to work. 
11 Q. When was the first time you heard about a 
12 buyout or a possible buyout of Mr. Lanto1 position? 
13 A. I don't recall. I don't know how I got 
14 this, made this statement hejre. I don't know the 
15 basis for it right now. But I must have heard it 
16 J someplace. But I couldn't—or I wouldn't have said 
17 that. 
18 Q. Could the basis for this statement have 
19 I come from your telephone conversation with Mr. Page 
20 on or about December 6 or 7, 1995? 
21 A. I would assume so. That was our principal 
22 contact. 
23 Q. Mr. Page was your principal contact, is 
24 that what you mean? 
25 A. At that time, yes. 
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deposition, of course, so you can do whatever you 
want. But it may be more productive to go through 
the sequence with Diane and then fill in gaps or 
other questions with Bob, because I don't think 
we're accomplishing very much right now. 
MR. HOWE: I'll do that. I want to make 
sure I get his impressions on the documents, and 
just if he doesn't remember meetings in the interim, 
that's fine. 
MR. RUSSELL: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what has been 
previously marked as Deposition Exhibit — 
MR. RUSSELL: Nine. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) — 9 , and ask you to take a 
look at that and tell me if you recognize it? 
MR. RUSSELL: This is a letter dated May 9, 
1996 from Norman Larson to you, regarding the joint 
venture — a joint venture proposal for the 
development of a franchise motel and refinancing of 
the waterpark located in Moab, Utah. 
THE WITNESS: I remember the letter, yes. 
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) You recall seeing the 
letter? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you respond to the letter? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Why didn't you respond to that letter? 
A. What we're talking about a partner, joint 
venture partner, no reference in this letter here to 
our joint venture partnership. And sticking to the 
subject of our partnership, it sounds like it was 
going off on a tangent somewhere. It just didn't 
make any sense to me. This proposal, it doesn't 
even fit our agreement that we have in joint 
venture, operating agreement. We have all our rules 
about the joint venture, we're supposed to notify 
each other and keep each other informed, and this is 
off on a tangent of everything that our agreement 
calls for, as far as I can tell. And I just didn't 
think it was relevant to even answer it. Too 
farfetched as far as I was concerned. 
Q. Did the proposal seem—aside from whether 
it would be against the spirit of any partnership, 
did the proposal seem sound to you? 
A. What? 
Q. Did the proposal seem sound to you, to your 
recollection? 
A. I didn't pay much attention to that aspect 
of it. I just rejected and didn't see any need of 
pursuing it. I didn't even answer at the time. 
